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ARTICLES
COMING OUT: DECISION-MAKING IN STATE AND
FEDERAL SODOMY CASES
Susan Ayres*
The law is meant to be a way in which people can live to-
gether in spite of their differences.
-James Boyd White'




In 1791, American states were enacting laws against sodomy at
the same time they ratified the Bill of Rights, the first ten constitu-
tional amendments meant to safeguard fundamental rights of indi-
viduals in a free society.3 In a March 1789 letter to James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson asserted that a bill of rights was necessary to
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A.,
Baylor University, 1982; M.A., University of Texas at San Antonio, 1985; J.D., Baylor Uni-
versity School of Law, 1988; Ph.D., Texas Christian University, 1997. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the valuable comments and suggestions of Barbara Bernier, Carl Bogus, Neil Easter-
brook, Jonathon Gutoff, Bruce Kogan, Peter Kostant, Mari J. Matsuda, Nancy Myers, Amy
Ronner, James Boyd White, and David Zlotnick. I also wish to thank Jason Erb and Nikki
Perkins for their research assistance.
1 JAMEs BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 47 (1985).
2 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA 17 (John D.
Caputo ed., 1997). In quoting the definition of justice given by Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida
characterizes the definition as "very minimal but which I love, which I think is really rigor-
ous." Id.
3 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 n.5 (1986) (noting that sodomy was a
common law crime and that the original 13 states had anti-sodomy laws); see also ROBERT
ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, 220 (A Classics ed., North-
eastern Univ. Press 1983) (1955).
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give the judiciary the power to protect such individual rights.4
Ironically, that which the judiciary gives, it may also take away,
since "[t]he legislator is a writer. And the judge a reader."5
This Article deconstructs recent sodomy cases in order to chal-
lenge judicial adoption or reinscription of "the straight mind," the
social construct grounded in and perpetuating the heterosexual
paradigm.6 Although deconstruction informs the argument, the
Wallace Stevens poem A High-Toned Old Christian Woman7 is used
as an extended metaphor for the analysis of judicial reasoning in
selected state and federal sodomy cases. The first half of the poem
reads:
Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame.
Take the moral law and make a nave of it
And from the nave build haunted heaven. Thus,
The conscience is converted into'palms,
Like windy citherns hankering for hymns.
We agree in principle. That's clear. But take
The opposing law and make a peristyle,
And from the peristyle project a masque
Beyond the planets. Thus, our bawdiness,
Unpurged by epitaph, indulged at last,
Is equally converted into palms,
Squiggling like saxophones. And palm for palm,
4 See RUTLAND, supra note 3, at 196 (noting that "the potentialities of the high court as a
protector of a citizen's rights had not escaped Jefferson").
5 JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 113 (Barbara Johnson, trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
1981) (1972). Legislators write statutes which judges then interpret. This quote comes from
Derrida's essay, Plato's Pharmacy, a deconstructive reading of Plato's dialogue Phaedrus.
See id. at 65. Although Plato values, or privileges, speech over writing in Phaedrus, Derrida
shows how elsewhere Plato privileges writing over speech. See id. at 113. For example, the
Republic privileges writing in the following statement: "because legal prescriptions.., once
put into writing... remain always on record," and can thus be studied: "There is, in truth,
no study whatsoever so potent as this of law."' Id. Although judges are readers, their read-
ings rewrite the law. So, even the reader/writer binary is a false one. As is discussed in Part
II, Derrida's essay is an example of a deconstructive reading. See infra notes 57-102 and ac-
companying text. Part of his project in Plato's Pharmacy is to deconstruct the father/son bi-
nary, in which the father, as origin of logos, reigns over the son. See id. at 75-78, 85. Simi-
larly, this Article attempts to demonstrate ways in which the federal father is usurped by the
state son. See infra Part IV (discussing state court rejections of Bowers).
6 See MONIQUE WITTIG, THE STRAIGHT MIND AND OTHER ESSAYS 27-28 (1992) (discussing
"the oppressive character that the straight mind is clothed in").
7 WALLACE STEVENS, A High-Toned Old Christian Woman, in THE PALM AT THE END OF
THE MIND 77 (Holly Stevens ed., Archon Books 1984) (1971).
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Madame, we are where we began,8
In this poem, addressed to "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman,"
Stevens describes two possible worlds: a "nave" (i.e., the central
part of a cathedral) derived from "the moral law," and a "peristyle"
(i.e., columns surrounding a temple or court) derived from "the op-
posing law." Although the moral law satisfies the "conscience," the
opposing law "indulge[s]" it. So, although "we agree in principle"
with the consequences of the moral law, Stevens preferred the
"bawdiness" of the opposing law and "imagined a world where
sexuality was to be indulged and displayed like the sounds of the
words themselves."
s
A High-Toned Old Christian Woman serves as a metaphor for ju-
dicial reasoning in sodomy cases. As argued in this Article, Bowers
v. Hardwick10 represents the "haunted heaven" built from the
"moral law" concerning homosexuality and sodomy. In this fre-
quently-cited decision," the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sod-
omy law. Bowers contrasts with state decisions that have stricken
sodomy laws, such as Commonwealth v. Wasson,12 State v. Mo-
rales,13 Campbell v. Sundquist,14 and Gryczan v. State.15 These
cases "take ... [t]he opposing law and make a peristyle" rejecting
Bowers v. Hardwick.
Wallace Stevens, who was a lawyer in addition to being a poet,
was undoubtedly well-acquainted with the phenomenon of legal
reasoning in which the analysis of a specific set of facts could result
in widely disparate conclusions.16 Just as Stevens attempted to
8 Id. The second half of this poem is reproduced in Part IV of this Article.
9 JOAN RICHARDSON, WALLACE STEVENS: THE EARLY YEARS, 1879-1923, at 301-02 (1986).
10 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11 See, e.g., Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation
in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 893, 917 (noting the state court
cases that rejected Bowers). As of October 1998, there were over 2000 law review and jour-
nal articles that cited Bowers. Search of WESTLAW, Law Reviews and Journals Combined
Library (Oct. 14, 1998).
12 See 842 S.W.2d 487, 502 (Ky. 1993) (affirming the circuit court's decision that the
criminal statute prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy violated privacy rights guaran-
teed by the Kentucky Constitution).
13 See 869 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. 1994). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss for want of ju-
risdiction based on a finding that the parties did not have standing. See id. at 949.
14 See 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that Tennessee's Homosexual
Practices Act was unconstitutional, and that petitioners had standing despite the fact that
none of them had been prosecuted under the Act).
15 See 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997) (concluding that Montana's deviate-sexual-conduct
statute is unconstitutional).
16 See Daniel J. Kornstein, The Double Life of Wallace Stevens: Is Law Ever the
'Necessary Angel' of Creative Art?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1187, 1208, 1220 (1997) (arguing
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rout out "the flaccid underside of any dogmatic position,"17 this Ar-
ticle joins numerous others which criticize Bowers' flaccid founda-
tion.'8 Specifically, it illustrates how Bowers produces the straight
mind and examines whether other cases successfully subvert that
production. Also asked is what happens when we consider the ethi-
cal implications of these sodomy decisions. Can the law incorporate
an ethics of care for the other, or must it continue to oppress the
other?
To lay the foundation for answering these questions, Part I de-
fines the straight mind and traces its historical development rely-
ing primarily on the work of Michel Foucault. 9 Part II briefly de-
fines deconstruction and considers features of a deconstructive
reading.20 This deconstructive approach provides a practical and
pragmatic technique to interrogate judicial reasoning and to change
injustice. Part III critiques Bowers by showing how the decision in-
corporates or reinscribes the straight mind.2' Part IV presents sev-
eral state decisions that rejected Bowers' reasoning and argues that
even though these state decisions reject Bowers and come to an op-
posite conclusion, they are not always completely successful in re-
jecting the straight mind. 22 Although examining how the law pro-
duces the straight mind constitutes an ethical endeavor, Part V
focuses on three problems that more obviously concern ethical is-
sues: (i) the failure to acknowledge violence encouraged by the
straight mind; (ii) the failure to enforce sodomy statutes; and (iii)
the failure to inculcate an ethics of inclusion or care for the other.23
that Stevens' poetry was influenced by legal thinking, including the notion "that poetry de-
pended on the same type of reasoning as law"); see also THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE
STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY 35-51 (1991) (discussing connections be-
tween Stevens' legal practice and poetry).
17 RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 438.
18 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 373
(1997) (analyzing the role of Bowers after the Romer decision); Janet E. Halley, Romer v.
Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429 (1997) (examining sex and hate in Bowers); Courtney G.
Joslin, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225 (1997) (noting the narrow holding in Bowers that
"there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy under the Due Process Clause"); Anne
B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988) (discussing how the
court reached its decision in Bowers); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination
in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773 (1988) (theorizing that Bowers has
been used as a justification for discrimination against homosexuals).
19 See infra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 103-56 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 157-249 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 250-301 and accompanying text.
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Sodomy cases apply universal laws, i.e., civil liberties that try to
protect individual rights in a pluralistic society. In applying these
universal laws, however, the cases fail to reconciliate self and other,
and thus illustrate a cardinal binary interrogated by deconstruc-
tion: the subject/object or subject/other. 24 As will be argued below,
the appearance of reconciliation usually indicates that the writing
is a "product of ideological distortion, suppression of difference or
subordination of the other."
25
I. THE STRAIGHT MIND
The straight mind is the social construct or law that regulates
sexuality. 26 According to Monique Wittig, who coined the term, the
rhetoric or discourses of the straight mind "are those which take for
granted that what founds society, any society, is heterosexuality." 27
She points out that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the
term "heterosexuality" was coined as the opposite of
"homosexuality."28  The evolution of the straight mind cannot be
traced because "[i]t has sneaked into dialectical thought ... as its
main category."29 Wittig castigates "the oppressive character that
the straight mind is clothed in... to immediately universalize its
production of concepts into general laws which claim to hold true
for all societies, all epochs, all individuals."3 0
In addition to universalizing general laws, the straight mind also
wields power over those it oppresses.31 A necessary consequence of
the straight mind is the oppression of the "different/other"-of the
other sex, other race.32  The straight mind cannot function
"economically, symbolically, linguistically, or politically" without
domination over the other.33 Thus, although the straight mind may
24 See Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy
and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF JUSTICE 152, 153, 168 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the "crisis" in legal
interpretation).
25 Id. at 153.
26 See WITTIG, supra note 6, at 27 (discussing the "primitive concepts" that reinforce "the
straight mind").
27 Id. at 24.
28 See id. at 41 (explaining the origin of the term homosexuality).
29 Id. at 43. An example is the implicit requirement from Aristotle's The Politics that
male and female "must be united in a pair.'" Id. at 42.
30 Id. at 27.
31 See id. at 25-26 (using pornography as an illustative example).
32 Id. at 28.
33 Id. at 28-29.
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unite male and female as a pair, it oppresses female as the other,
just as it oppresses the homosexual or gay as other.3 4
The French philosopher Michel Foucault has traced the historical
development of the heterosexual imperative in his three-volume
work, The History of Sexuality.35 Foucault analyzes sex as power
relations, rather than as the result of "repression or law."3 6 He ar-
gues that sexuality is not a "natural given," but:
[i]t is the name that can be given to a historical construct:
not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great sur-
face network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensi-
fication of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the forma-
tion of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and
resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a
few major strategies of knowledge and power.37
Defining "power" as the "multiplicity of force relations immanent
in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organization,"38 Foucault theorizes that in the eighteenth century,
four measures formed specific mechanisms of power and knowledge
regarding sex: (i) analyzing female bodies as sexual and hysterical;
(ii) protecting and preventing children's sexual potential; (iii) con-
ducting social and economic studies of procreative behavior; and (iv)
clinically analyzing perverse pleasure.3 9 Although all four are sig-
nificant to his history of sexuality, the fourth is of special impor-
tance to an examination of sodomy decisions. The standard for de-
termining perverse pleasures was the heterosexual institution.40 In
analyzing Foucault's thesis, Judith Butler explains that in the his-
torical construction of sex, heterosexual desire not only established
34 See Linda Fitts Mischler, Reconciling Rapture, Representation, and Responsibility: An
Argument Against Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sex, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 235-37
(1996) (describing "deep-seated societal views toward women and sexuality generally").
3r See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hur-
ley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1976) [hereinafter 1 FOUCAULT] (discussing the history of
sexuality in the West); 2 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE OF
PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1984) [hereinafter 2 FOUCAULT]
(exploring how sexuality in the West became a moral issue); 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE CARE OF THE SELF (Robert Hurley trans., Random House 1986)
(1984) [hereinafter 3 FOUCAULT] (describing issues that relate to our sexual mores).
36 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 92.
37 Id. at 105-06.
38 Id. at 92.
39 See id. at 103-05 (noting that such measures emerged as "mechanisms of knowledge
and power centering on sex" in the eighteenth-century).
40 See id. at 105.
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the male/female gender binary, but also regulated sexual prac-
tices.
41
As a historical matter, Foucault reports that up to the end of the
eighteenth century, sex was regulated based on the marriage rela-
tionship by canonical law, the Christian pastoral, and civil law.
42
During this period, these three codes emphasized the unlawful con-
duct that broke marriage vows or sought strange pleasures. 43 As
Foucault indicates, "[p]rohibitions bearing on sex were essentially
of a juridical nature."44 This emphasis changed in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries when codes and institutions were less
concerned with the sexuality of the legitimate couple than with the
sexuality of others.45 Based on his historical survey, Foucault ar-
gues that the type of power that the nineteenth century wielded
over sexuality was not law or taboo, not "an age of increased sexual
repression," but an age that extended various forms of sexuality.
46
What was scrutinized during this period was the sexuality of chil-
dren, the insane, and the homosexual. 47 Thus, in the nineteenth
century there were fewer legal codes relating to sexual offenses,
but, in scrutinizing the sexuality of the unnatural, medicine and
other institutions exercised greater power to define and manage
sexual practices, 48 especially "peripheral sexualities." 49  For in-
stance, medicine transformed the sodomite from "a temporary aber-
ration" to a defined psychiatric "species."
50
In looking at how power constructs sexuality, which is not a
"natural given," Foucault imagines "a multiplicity of discursive
elements" that exist in different contexts and that are not neces-
sarily consistent:
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power,
but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance
41 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
22-23 (1990) ("The institution of a compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality requires and
regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a
feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished through the practices of heterosexual
desire.").
42 See 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 37 (describing these regulations as "explicit codes").
43 See id.
44 Id. at 38.
45 See id. at 38-39 ("The legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality, had a right to more
discretion.").
46 Id. at 49.
47 See id. at 39.
48 See id. at 40-41 (noting that "law itself often deferred to medicine").
49 Id. at 40.
50 Id. at 43.
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and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also un-
dermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it pos-
sible to thwart it.51
In other words, "law might be understood to produce or generate
the desire it is said to repress."52 The law, including decisions such
as Bowers, participates in Foucault's description of the construction
of sexuality grounded in heterosexual repression. 53
Using the history of sodomy, Foucault demonstrates this two-fold
operation of discourse as both creating and undermining power.5 4
In the eighteenth century, there was both "extreme severity
(punishment by fire)" and widespread tolerance for sodomy "which
one can deduce indirectly from the infrequency of judicial sen-
tences, and which one glimpses more directly through certain
statements concerning societies of men that were thought to exist
in the army or in the courts."5 5 Thus, not only were strict prohibi-
tions against sodomy unenforced, but sodomy was socially accepted.
A similar pattern arose in the nineteenth century in which
"psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of dis-
courses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion,
pederasty, and 'psychic hermaphrodism'" made social controls pos-
sible, but which also gave rise to a "'reverse' discourse" in which
"homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its
legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowledged, often in the same vo-
cabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically dis-
qualified."5
6
Deconstructive techniques, informed by Foucault's theory that
sex is an effect or a historical construct of power relations, are ap-
plied in Parts III and IV to read sodomy decisions. Do these deci-
sions construct the straight mind? Do they adopt or re-inscribe the
straight mind? Do they subvert it? Do they both produce and re-
press homosexual desire? Before considering these judicial opinions
concerning sodomy, Part II shows how these features of deconstruc-
51 Id. at 101.
52 BUTLER, supra note 41, at 75.
53 According to Butler, "the law produces the conceit of the repressed desire in order to
rationalize its own self-amplifying strategies." Id. at 65. Rather than repressing desire, law
is "a discursive practice which is productive or generative-discursive in that it produces the
linguistic fiction of repressed desire in order to maintain its own position as a teleological
instrument." Id.
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tion-the focus on binary oppositions and ambiguities in meaning,
intertextuality, deferred meaning, and undecidability-provide a
practical way to read sodomy decisions.
II. DECONSTRUCTING SODOMY DECISIONS
Deconstruction has been defined as "a theory of reading which
aims to undermine the logic of opposition within [texts]. "57 A de-
constructive approach seeks to reveal and interrogate hierarchical
binary systems. It also shows the "disparities between what the
author of a text 'means to say' and what the text is 'nonetheless
constrained to mean."'5 8 These discontinuities-gaps in meaning, or
blind spots-occur when a text self-contradicts and "involuntarily
betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic." 59 Jacques Derrida,
the French philosopher considered to have founded deconstruction,
specifically warns that "[d]econstruction is not a method or some
tool that you apply to something from the outside...
[d]econstruction is something... which happens inside."60 His
reading typically isolates binary oppositions, and he attempts to
show "that what has been presented as a dichotomy in Western
thought, such as man/woman, is in fact merely a difference which
has [become] a hierarchy."61 Deconstruction does not try to synthe-
size meaning into a coherent whole, but "search[es] for... system-
atic contradictions and uncontrollable ambiguities in meaning."62
In addition to focusing on contradictions and ambiguities, decon-
structive readings are intertextual because texts are not seen as
self-contained, but as a mesh of other texts. Thus, Derrida's short-
hand phrase that "there is no 'outside-the-text'" captures this
57 A DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL AND CRITICAL THEORY 136 (Michael Payne et al. eds.,
1996). Many theorists stress the dangers of defining deconstruction. See, e.g., Rosenfeld,
supra note 24, at 152 ("Any attempt at defining deconstruction is hazardous at best as there
is disagreement over whether deconstruction is a method.., based on a particular ontologi-
cal and ethical vision."); see also Ronald KL. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEx. L. REV.
215, 225, 237, 244 (1997) (reviewing DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, and
evaluating Derrida's warning against nutshelling deconstruction).
58 Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 153.
59 CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA 19 (1987).
60 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 9.
61 A DICTIONARY OF CULTURE AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 57, at 136.
62 Id. A recent example of a deconstructive reading of several judicial decisions involving
contract law and statutory interpretation can be found in Madeleine Plasencia, Who's Afraid
of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References in Judicial Opinions, 21 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 215 (1997); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,
94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985).
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premise of the intertextuality of all texts.63 And, as Jonathan Cul-
ler points out, intertextuality in law is "abundantly evident" since
"any case is part of an endless text: it[ ] has potential points of con-
tact with a vast array of other cases and other data."6 4 This inter-
textuality is illustrated in the Kentucky sodomy case of Wasson by
defendant's evidence presented by a cultural anthropologist, Pres-
byterian minister, social historian, sociologist/sex researcher, psy-
chologist, therapist, and medical professor, as well as the court's
reliance on the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and on scientific data
concerning sexual preferences and AIDS.65 Another example, dis-
cussed below, is Bowers' reliance on historical surveys of sodomy
laws-from the time of Ancient Rome to the present.66 Finally, this
Article illustrates intertextuality by reading A High-Toned Old
Christian Woman against sodomy decisions.
Derrida explores the relation between law and deconstruction in
an essay entitled Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of
Authority.'67 He begins by discussing the "force of law," the violence
of law's enforceability:
[t]here are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but there
is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or en-
forceability of the law without force, whether this force be
direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or interior,
brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or
regulative, and so forth. 68
The question is how to distinguish between "force that can be just,
or in any case deemed legitimate" and violent force that is not le-
gitimate. 69 Derrida seeks to deconstruct, "by destabilizing or com-
63 JONATHAN CULLER, FRAMING THE SIGN: CRITICISM AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 148 (1988).
This intertextuality is not unlicensed free-play, but disciplined reading of "words 'actually
present' in a discourse with all the other words in the lexical system." DERRIDA, supra note
5, at 129-30; see id. at 334-35 (discussing the "intertext").
64 CULLER, supra note 63, at 148.
65 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 496-97, 500, 501 (Ky. 1993).
66 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) ("Proscriptions against that con-
duct [consensual homosexual sodomy] have ancient roots.").
67 See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,' in DE-
CONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 15. The essay was distrib-
uted at a colloquium in 1989 at Cardozo Law School where Derrida presented the opening
session. See id. at 3.
68 Id. at 6.
69 Id.
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plicating the opposition" between law and justice, among other op-
positions.
70
The tension between force and law reminds us that "if justice is
not necessarily law ... it cannot become justice legitimately or de
jure except by withholding force or rather by appealing to force from
its first moment."71 Reinterpreting Montaigne's idea that "laws
keep up their good standing, not because they are just, but because
they are laws: that is the mystical foundation of their authority,"
72
Derrida follows a line of argument that begins with Plato and con-
tinues through Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein, by distinguishing
laws and justice: "[1]aws are not just as laws. One obeys them not
because they are just but because they have authority."73 Again
quoting Montaigne's statement that "even our law, it is said, has
legitimate fictions on which it founds the truth of its justice,"74 Der-
rida raises the question, "[w]hat does it mean to establish the truth
of justice?"75 Law, he argues, has no transcendental ground or
foundation, thus it can be deconstructed; justice, however, is not de-
constructible.7 6  This paradox makes deconstruction possible.
"There is a necessary, structural gap or distance between the law
and justice, and deconstruction situates itself there, in that space or
interval, in that abyss."77 Wittig's straight mind illustrates this
"legitimate fiction" that acts as foundation for sodomy decisions.
But is the straight mind a "legitimate fiction?" How can it be de-
constructed?
Derrida gives three "aporias,"78 of the justice/law distinction. The
first aporia is the "dpokh6 [suspension] of the rule," or the "'fresh
judgment' made every time the law is applied.79 In other words,
for a decision to be just, a judge does not merely follow a rule of law,
"but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a reinsti-
tuting act of interpretation, as if ultimately nothing previously ex-
70 Id. at 8. Some of the other oppositions he mentions are positive law and natural law,
the subject of law and the subject of morality. See id.
71 Id. at 10.




76 See id. at 14-15 (discussing the structure of the law).
77 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 131-32. This paradox leads Derrida
to conclude that "Deconstruction is justice." Derrida, supra note 67, at 15.
78 For Derrida, an aporia is a "moment where oppositions are held in mutual suspension,
neither term of which can be granted structuring primacy or qualitative superiority." A
DICTIONARY OF CULTURE AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 57, at 142.
79 Derrida, supra note 67, at 23.
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isted of the law, as if the judge himself invented the law in every
case."80 The "suspension of the rule" implies that the judge does not
simply apply the law as "a calculating machine"; rather, the judge
"reinvent[s] it in each case."8' Thus, in sodomy cases, the court re-
invents the law and reinscribes the straight mind by an act of
writing. This is a two-fold action: first, the re-invention or re-
interpretation of past cases; and second, the re-inscription of the
law through writing. Paradoxically, "there is never a moment that
we can say in the present that a decision is just."8 2 Rather, "[a] just
decision is found in the distance between a blind and universal law
and the singularity of the situation before us."8
3
Another way of considering this paradox is in terms of deferred
meaning, in which
[t]he meaning of a writing is neither immediately given nor
self-present, but depends on some future reading (or re-
collecting) of that writing's past. And since all reading in-
volves a rewriting, all meaning depends on a future rewrit-
ing of past writings as rewritten in the present writing
which confronts the interpreter. A present writing is a re-
written past writing and a not yet rewritten future writing.8 4
For instance, sodomy decisions often involve distributive justice,8 5
in which "a judge must project a present into the future in order to
fashion an appropriate distributive remedy," even though the crite-
ria for the decision "always appears embedded in a past."8 6 Mean-
ing is deferred; decisions rewrite precedent inscribing or subverting
the straight mind. Thus, Bowers interprets precedent to reinscribe
the straight mind, whereas the four state cases-Wasson, Morales,
Gryczan, and Campbell-subvert the straight mind.
Related to the first aporia of the "suspension of the rule" is the
second aporia, "the ghost of the undecidable," which is more than
the tension between a decision and precedent, but is the fleeting




83 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 137.
84 Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 157.
85 Distributive justice allocates the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, and it con-
trasts with corrective justice, which involves damages and wrongdoing, as in criminal and
tort law. See id. at 180-81.
86 Id. at 195.
87 Derrida, supra note 67, at 24. Derrida writes that "The undecidable is not merely the
oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though
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not go through "the ordeal of the undecidable" is not a just deci-
sion.88 Glossing this second aporia, John Caputo's commentary con-
trasts "the ordeal of the undecidable" with automatic application of
laws to situations, and explains that "a 'just' decision ... goes eye-
ball to eyeball with undecidability, stares it in the face (literally),
looks into that abyss, and then makes the leap, that... 'gives itself
up to the impossible decision."8 9
Paradoxically, Derrida states that we can never say a decision is
just because "either it has not yet been made according to a rule,
and nothing allows us to call it just, or it has already followed a
rule."90 We can never determine whether a decision is just, whether
a judge went through the ordeal of the undecidable in making a de-
cision.91 As Caputo comments, "U]ustice must be continually in-
vented, or reinvented, from decision to decision."92 In analyzing
these sodomy decisions, we can never say that a decision is just.
The most we can do is seek the ghost of undecidability: the way a
court responds to previous decisions and to the "'idea of justice"'
that is "owed to the other."93
The third aporia Derrida presents is "the urgency that obstructs
the horizon of knowledge."94 The horizon-"both the opening and
the limit that defines an infinite progress or a period of waiting"-is
obstructed by justice because "a just decision is always required
immediately," so there is no time to analyze "the unlimited knowl-
edge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could jus-
tify it."95 This third aporia is a pragmatic limiting factor. Conse-
quently, as Derrida refers to Kierkegaard as saying, "[t]he instant
of decision is a madness."96 Urgency limits the ability to leisurely
consider the horizon; thus, justice is always "'[p]erhaps': "Justice
remains, is yet, to come."
97
heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged.., to give
itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules." Id.
88 Id.
89 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 137.
90 Derrida, supra note 67, at 24.
91 For this reason, the undecidable is a ghost because it "remains caught, lodged, at least
as a ghost-but an essential ghost-in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostli-
ness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude ... that would as-
sure us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very event of a decision." Id. at 24-25.
92 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 138.
93 Derrida, supra note 67, at 25.
94 Id. at 26.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 27.
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For Derrida, tlheurgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge
does not justify our staying out of politics. 98 Even though "justice
exceeds law and calculation," he believes that the "incalculable jus-
tice requires us to calculate."99 We have an obligation "to change
things and to intervene in an efficient and responsible.., way, not
only in the profession but in what one calls the citg, the polis and
more generally the world."100 Thus, against charges that decon-
struction is "a kind of anarchistic relativism in which 'anything
goes,'" or that traditions are empty concepts to be deconstructed,
Derrida urges world involvement and change. 1 1 He states that
"[n]othing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipa-
tory ideal."10 2 The following sections of this Article provide a decon-
structive reading of selected state and federal sodomy cases for
which the ultimate goal is to calculate one contemporary register of
this classical emancipatory ideal.
III. BOWERS v. HARDWICK: "TAKE THE MORAL LAW AND MAKE A
NAVE OF IT"
103
Bowers takes "the moral law" and builds a "haunted heaven."
10 4
In 1982, Hardwick was charged with committing sodomy with an-
other male in his bedroom. 05 The district attorney decided not to
indict, so Hardwick brought suit in federal court to challenge the
constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute. 0 6 The district court
dismissed Hardwick's claim, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held
the statute violated fundamental rights, and the Supreme Court re-
versed and held the statute constitutional. 10 7 Before considering
how the Supreme Court's holdings and reasoning accept and rein-
scribe the straight mind, two prefatory points about the decision
will be made. First, the majority decision re-interpreted Georgia's
heterosexual sodomy statute08 as a homosexual sodomy statute:
98 See id. at 28 ("That justice exceeds law and calculation.., cannot and should not serve
as an alibi for staying out ofjuridico-political battles.").
99 Id.
100 Id. at 8-9.
101 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 37-38.
102 Derrida, supra note 67, at 28.
103 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 77.
104 Id.
105 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
106 See id. at 188-89 (noting that Hardwick felt that because he was a practicing homosex-
ual he was in imminent danger of being arrested because of the statute).
107 See id.
108 Georgia's statute provided (as quoted in Bowers):
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"[t]he issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 10 9 As
both dissents point out, however, the statute covers both heterosex-
ual and homosexual sodomy." 0 The majority's re-interpretation of
the statute paved the way for the Court's reinforcement of the
straight mind when it analyzed two constitutional challenges: the
right to privacy and due process."'
Second, in determining a case of consensual homosexual sodomy
that occurred in the privacy of Hardwick's bedroom, 12 the Supreme
Court outrightly denied its judicial power to privilege and to rein-
scribe the straight mind by stating that "[this case does not require
a judgment on whether laws against sodomy between consenting
adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or
desirable."113 The Court went on to note that
[s]triving to assure itself and the public that announcing
rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text in-
volves much more than the imposition of the Justices' own
choice of values on the States and the Federal Government,
the Court has sought to identify the nature of the rights
qualifying for heightened judicial protection. 14
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another ....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one nor more than 20 years ....
Id. at 188 n.1.
109 Id. at 190. This reinterpretation also demonstrates another feature of deconstruc-
tion-the indeterminacy of language. See Collins, supra note 57, at 232 (discussing the "fixed
meaning of legal texts").
110 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 214 n.2 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
1I The rhetorical analysis by Andrew Jacobs provides helpful insight in this analysis.
Jacobs examines what he calls Track One and Track Two discourse in gay rights cases:
Track One opinions.., reenact the Bowers argument about the intrinsic wrongness of
homosexuality, which equates gays with the criminal act of sodomy, thereby construct-
ing gays in epitome as a deviant and criminal sex act, and not a discrete social group.
Track Two opinions recognize that gays are a class of victims, and consider whether to
extend particular legal benefits or antidiscrimination protections to them ....
Jacobs, supra note 11, at 902.
112 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88 (noting where the act took place).
113 Id. at 190.
114 Id. at 191. Such a statement of judicial objectivity may often "betray a hint of moral
ambivalence," as here, where Justice White's disclaimers can be read ironically to mean just
the opposite. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid
Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1929, 1932 (1991). Delgado and Stefancic label Bowers
an example of "serious moral error," which they define as a decision which (1) "lacks nuance
to an embarrassing degree"; (2) is condemned by later generations; and (3) makes assump-
tions that are later refuted. Id. at 1930 n.2.
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Despite these assertions of judicial objectivity that the Court is
not determining whether homosexual sodomy is "wise or desirable"
or whether the Justices are "impos[ing] ... [their] own choice of
values," Bowers results in a choice of values based on and perpetu-
ating the straight mind. 115 Bowers is like the nave in Stevens' poem
that is based on moral values.
By rewriting the lower court decision to reverse the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's holding that the statute was unconstitutional, Bowers' inter-
pretation was grounded in the straight mind. The Court rejected
the Eleventh Circuit's determination that prior cases had favorably
decided the issue of whether the right of privacy extended to homo-
sexual sodomy. 116 In citing a long line of privacy cases, the Court
failed to distinguish these past cases, but instead, merely concluded
that "we think it evident that none.., bears any resemblance...
[:] [n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demon-
strated."11 7 The Court's refusal to see any "resemblance" between
"family, marriage, or procreation" and "homosexual activity" ig-
nores a logical and obvious conclusion, and, in effect is a regulation
of sexuality based on the straight mind. This is a continuation of
the universalizing tendency which Wittig critiques, 118 as well as an
example of the socialization of procreative behavior that Foucault
sees as one measure/mechanism of power and knowledge regarding
115 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. Thomas Stoddard makes a similar claim that
[a] careful review of [Bowers v. Hardwick], including the decisions of the two lower
courts, makes clear that the Court's opinion in Hardwick rests upon nothing more sub-
stantial than the collective distaste of the five justices in the majority for the conduct
under scrutiny. The opinion is, to be blunt, devoid of logic.
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 648, 649 (1987).
116 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. The court of appeals held that homosexual sodomy was a
fundamental right, and relied on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the Texas statute
that criminalizes abortion at any stage unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (holding that the Massachusetts law forbidding distribution of contraceptives to single
people violated equal protection); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere possession of obscene materials a
crime); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding Connecticut's law banning
contraceptives as an unconstitutional invasion of marital privacy). See Hardwick v. Bowers,
760 F.2d 1202, 1213 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled by Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
117 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91. These other cases involved the education of children in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
family relationships in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); procreation in Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and interracial marriage in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
118 See WITTIO, supra note 6, at 27-28 (discussing the "oppressive character of the straight
mind").
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sexuality. 119 The Court regulated sexuality based on an assumption
of compulsory heterosexuality. 120 Bowers' holding that past cases
did not extend the right to privacy to homosexual sodomy had the
effect of rewriting the past cases-by narrowing them under the ae-
gis of the straight mind. As Justice Blackmun stresses in the dis-
sent, however, past cases do not have to be interpreted in terms of
heterosexual family values, but could be rewritten in terms of sex-
ual privacy of individuals.
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some
direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but
because they form so central a part of an individual's life.
[T]he concept of privacy embodies the "moral fact that a per-
son belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a
whole."121
After rejecting the argument that precedent establishes a privacy
right in homosexual sodomy, the majority next considered the issue
of whether such a right should be created and despite previously
denying its judicial power, curtly declared: "[tihis we are quite un-
willing to do."122 In determining that there is not a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy, Bowers rewrites past cases to emphasize
the protection of fundamental rights "'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty"' and/or "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."123 The Court also relies on a historical survey of sodomy
statutes to bolster its conclusion that "to claim that a right to en-
gage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, fa-
119 See 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 103-05 (noting that sexuality influences many rela-
tionships in virtually all societies).
120 The state court decisions that follow Bowers also narrowly interpret precedent in order
to reinscribe the straight mind. See, e.g., State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707, 710 (R.I. 1995)
(holding that a state constitution privacy right of unmarried adults to engage in heterosexual
sodomy was not violated because "Inone of the fundamental rights enunciated in those cases
involving family relationships, marriage, or procreation bear any resemblance to the right
asserted in this case"); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 67-68 (R.I. 1980) ("[T]he right of privacy
[under the state and federal constitutions] is inapplicable to the private unnatural copulation
between unmarried adults" because "the right of privacy is closely related to the decision
whether or not to have a child"). Several commentators have noted this heterosexual as-
sumption. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denial of "In the Home" in Bowers v.
Hardwick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives and the Bacchae as Tools for Analyz-
ing Privacy and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 263, 294-97 (1996).
121 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring)).
122 Id. at 191.
123 Id. at 191-92 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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cetious."1 24 This historical survey is used to demonstrate that
"[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots":125
[s]odomy was a criminal offense at common law and was for-
bidden by laws of the original 13 States when they ratified
the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had
criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States out-
lawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Co-
lumbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy
performed in private and between consenting adults.
126
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence relies exclusively on evidence
that "the proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots." 27
Burger refers to prohibitions against sodomy passed in ancient
Rome and during the English Reformation. 128 The use of this his-
torical survey illustrates Foucault's observation concerning the ju-
ridico-discursive character of power that is "centered on nothing
more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos." 129
However, as Foucault argues, the effect of these juridical powers is
124 Id. at 194. Moreover, Anne Goldstein argues that Justice White's analysis rewrites the
history of sodomy laws because in 1868 only three states had homosexual sodomy laws;
therefore, "the evidence does not support Justice White's conclusion that the framers could
not have intended the Constitution to 'extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage
in acts of consensual sodomy."' Goldstein, supra note 18, at 1085.
125 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
126 Id. at 192-94 (footnotes omitted). As of 1998, twenty-two states continue to have sod-
omy laws: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63 (1994)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411
(West 1989)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 800.02 (West Supp. 1997)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1996)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §
18-6605 (1997)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN §
14:89 (West 1986)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS § 553 (1996));
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAwS §§ 750.158, 750.338-.338(b) (1991)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §
609.293 (1987)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §
566.090 (West Supp. 1997)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-505 (1987)); Ne-
vada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West Supp. 1995-96)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985)); Texas (TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994));
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(1) (1995)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie
1996)). In 1998, Rhode Island repealed section 11-10-1 "Crimes Against Nature." See R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1998) (deleting "either with mankind" language from the statute
and thereby de-criminalizing sodomy between two consenting adults). Also, in 1996, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that § 39-13-510 was an unconstitutional violation of the
right to privacy. See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
("[W]e hold that the Homosexual Practices Act, T.C.A. § 39-13-510, which criminalizes such
conduct, is unconstitutional."). This section was subsequently repealed. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-510 (Supp. 1997).
127 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
128 See id. at 196-97 (discussing the criminalization of sodomy).
129 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 85.
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not just to repress sexuality, but to extend various forms of sexual-
ity by an "implantation of multiple perversions." 130 Thus, ironically,
while the majority and concurrence may intend to implement the
morality view repressing homosexuality, the Foucaultian effect of
Bowers is that it discursively contributes to a resistance against
majority morals. 131 The lawsuit itself, as well as subsequent analy-
ses of Bowers, formed part of a reverse discourse in which homo-
sexuality began to demand legitimacy.
13 2
Bowers'.refusal to announce the creation of a fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy illustrates a (failed) reconciliation
between self and other. Derrida's remarks about Kafka's parable
Before the Law apply equally here:
[blefore the law, the man is a subject of the law in appearing
before it. This is obvious, but since he is before it because he
cannot enter it, he is also outside the law (an outlaw). He is
neither under the law nor in the law. He is both a subject of
the law and an outlaw. 1
33
Kafka's man from the country is a material representation of both
the nave and the peristyle. Likewise, in sodomy decisions such as
Bowers, the defendant is an outlaw charged with a crime, an outlaw
judged deviant by the straight mind, and thus an outlaw standing
outside the law. As Andrew Jacobs points out, a consequence of
Bowers was the determination that "gays were not like the 'us' of
American society for whom Justice White spoke... [i]nstead, they
were the Other-defined by a criminal act that the Supreme Court
announced was necessarily a source of moral opprobrium."134
130 Id. at 47-48.
131 See id. at 101 (discussing how social controls in this area of "perversity" paved the way
for a "reverse" discourse).
132 Jacobs traces the development of the reverse discourse leading from Bowers to Romer
in his analysis of "Track One" and "Track Two" rhetoric. See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 905,
917. Although Jacobs' reading is enlightened and persuasive, his description of two tracks is
too neat. "There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another dis-
course'that runs counter to it." 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 101.
133 JACQUES DERRIDA, Before the Law, reprinted in ACTS OF LITERATURE 181, 204 (Derek
Attridge ed., 1992). In Derrida's reading of Kafka's famous parable in The Trial, Derrida ar-
gues that the law is inaccessible for man because "between the guardian of the Law and the
man from the country there is no essential difference: they are in oppositional but symmet-
ric positions." Jacques Derrida, Women in the Beehive: A Seminar with Jacques Derrida,
reprinted in MEN IN FEMINISM 189, 191-92 (Alice Jardine & Paul Smith eds., 1987). They are
both before the law-the man from the country stands facing the law; the doorkeeper stands
with his back to the law. Thus, they are in oppositional positions, but since the law remains
inaccessible their positions are "symmetric." Id. at 192.
134 Jacobs, supra note 11, at 905.
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Chief Justice Burger's concurrence states the obvious conse-
quences of this judicial power: "[t]o hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to
cast aside millennia of moral teaching." 3 5 Burger's reasoning rein-
scribes the notion that "'you-will-be straight-or-you-will-not-be,"" 13 6
therefore keeping an outlaw in his or her place. The majority
analysis exemplifies Michel Rosenfeld's critique of "modern legal
discourse with its universalist aspirations-[that] cannot achieve
coherence and reconciliation so long as it produces writings that
cannot eliminate from their margins ideological distortions, unac-
counted differences or the lack of full recognition of any subordi-
nated other."1 37
A specific example illustrating Rosenfeld's critique and demon-
strating an inversion of privileged terms is Bowers' analysis of the
right to privacy, which by its very terms implies a privileging of the
private over the public. The majority's analysis, however, inverts
the private/public hierarchy by reasoning that the right to privacy
has only been extended to what most people would think of as the
public goals of perpetuating society through heterosexual marriage
and child rearing. 38 Similarly, Bowers analyzes the individual's
fundamental right to engage in sodomy-an analysis based on the
Due Process Clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
which again implies the privileging of the private over the public-
but the Court bases its refusal to privilege private rights on public
"[p]roscriptions against that conduct." 3 9 So once again, the analy-
sis based on public values undermines the privileged individual
rights. In refusing to look beyond the mere existence of the sodomy
law and moral views favoring the law, the Court validates or rein-
scribes the heterosexual institution, and contrary to its initial as-
sertion/premise, indeed passes judgment "on whether [such laws] ..
are wise or desirable." 40
135 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
136 WITTIG, supra note 6, at 28.
137 Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 153.
138 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-91 (1986) (finding that there is no fundamental right to
engage in sodomy).
139 Id. at 192.
140 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. Kendall Thomas persuasively argues that the Supreme Court
cross-dressed in Bowers by switching from a paternal to a maternal metaphor. See Kendall
Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV.
1805, 1819-21 (1993). This switch allowed the Court to discursively construct a heterosexual
identity. See id. at 1813.
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The blind spots in the Court's analysis of the right to privacy re-
appear in the Court's due process analysis that refuses "to discover
new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause."
14'
After noting that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution,"142 the Court rejects the argument in Stanley v. Geor-
gia'4 that greater protection should be afforded to conduct occur-
ring in the privacy of one's home. 44 In addition to distinguishing
Stanley v. Georgia on the ground that it involved a First Amend-
ment claim, 145 the Court makes a slippery-slope argument that
promotes the straight mind by equating homosexual conduct solely
with sodomy:
if respondent's submission is limited to the voluntary sexual
conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, ex-
cept by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct
while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and
other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the
home. We are unwilling to start down that road. 1
46
Finally, the Court upheld the Georgia sodomy statute under the
rational basis test.147 The Court did not question respondent's
claim that the rational basis "is none.., other than the presumed
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable."148 While not analyzing any
(other) rational basis, the Court merely gave a stamp of approval to
majority morals: "[t]he law, however, is constantly based on no-
tions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
courts will be very busy indeed."149 Several state decisions repeat
this morality justification in upholding sodomy statutes against
141 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
142 Id.
143 See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (noting that the state may not
prohibit the mere possession of obscene matter in one's home).
14 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 ("Stanley itself recognized that its holding offered no pro-
tection for the possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods.").
145 See id. ("Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been protected outside the
home, and it partially prevented the enforcement of state obscenity laws; but the decision
was firmly grounded in the First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
146 Id. at 195-96.




state or federal constitutional challenges. 150 The explicit reliance on
majority morals to uphold Georgia's sodomy statute is perhaps the
most obvious re-inscription of the straight mind and demonstrates
the most blatant failure to reconcile self and other. To reject ma-
jority morals, however, would, as Stevens declares in A High-Toned
Old Christian Woman, make "widows wince."15
Thus, Bowers fails to reconcile self and other, fails to live up to
James Boyd White's characterization of the law as "a way in which
people can live together in spite of their differences," 5 2 and instead,
exemplifies the straight mind's oppression of the homosexual other.
The dissent, which recasts the due process issue as a question
about "'the right to be let alone," 153 rejects the "millennia of moral
teaching,"154 and rewrites past opinions to focus on the right of an
individual to choose among diverse intimate practices in the privacy
of his or her own home. "The fact that individuals define them-
selves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relation-
ships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that
there may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relation-
ships." 55 The dissent attempts another rewriting of past cases by
focusing, for instance, on similarities such as in Loving v. Virginia,
the interracial marriage case, which declared the prohibition un-
constitutional despite the long-standing Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion. 5 6 Bowers' dissents form the basis for state court decisions,
such as Wasson, Campbell, Gryczan, and Morales, that hold homo-
150 See, e.g., Commonwealth'v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 511 (Ky. 1993) (Wintersheimer,
J., dissenting) ("There is a long history of laws against sodomy in Kentucky and elsewhere.
Of course it has been considered morally wrong since the beginning of time, but this is a
secular legal question here."). But see, e.g., State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc) ("Nowhere does the Constitution state that the promotion of morality is an imper-
missible state objective.").
151 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 78.
152 WHITE, supra note 1, at 47.
163 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Blackmun quotes Holmes' opinion that: "[iut is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that ... it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have van-
ished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."' Id. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897)).
155 Id. at 205. The dissent argues that "certain rights associated with the family have
been accorded shelter.., not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to
the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life." Id.
at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156 See 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that a statute criminalizing interracial marriages
violates the 14th Amendment); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny.").
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sexual sodomy statutes invalid under state constitutions, as dis-
cussed in the following section.
IV. STATE DECISIONS: "[T]AKE / THE OPPOSING LAW AND MAKE A
PERISTYLE"' 5 7
In Stevens' poem A High-Toned Old Christian Woman, the
masque "project[ed]" from the "opposing law," results in
"bawdiness" "[s]quiggling like saxophones," as contrasted with the
"haunted heaven" built from "the moral law," which results in
"conscience" "hankering for hymns." 58  In the second half of the
poem, Stevens describes the bawdy masque as follows:
... Allow,
Therefore, that in the planetary scene
Your disaffected flagellants, well-stuffed,
Smacking their muzzy bellies in parade,
Proud of such novelties of the sublime,
Such tink and tank and tunk-a-tunk-tunk,
May, merely may, madame, whip from themselves
A jovial hullabaloo among the spheres.
This will make widows wince. But fictive things
Wink as they will. Wink most when widows wince. 159
Decisions including Morales, Campbell, Gryczan, and Wasson
"take ... [tihe opposing law and make a peristyle," which indulges
"bawdiness" that "make[s] widows wince" by subverting the
straight mind. While not all challenges at the state level have been
successful, 60 in this Part the decisions that have rejected Bowers
are examined to determine the consequences of judicial power that
does not necessarily reinscribe the straight mind.'6 '
157 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 77.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 77-78.
160 See, e.g., Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996) (declining to reverse a sod-
omy conviction); Sawatzky v. City of Oklahoma City, 906 P.2d 785 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
(holding that city ordinances that prohibited sodomy did not violate equal protection); State
v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707 (R.I. 1995); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(upholding statute criminalizing deviate sexual intercourse).
161 Two state decisions are not considered in this Article that declared sodomy statutes
unconstitutional before Bowers was decided: Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa.
1980) (holding that a statute prohibiting sodomy between unmarried persons exceeded the
police power and violated the equal protection doctrine); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936
(N.Y. 1980) (reversing a sodomy conviction and declaring the statute unconstitutional).
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In Morales, a group of gay and lesbian plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment to challenge Texas's homosexual sodomy law.162 In
striking down the statute, the Texas Court of Appeals held that it
violated plaintiffs' right to privacy under the state constitution and
that the state failed to show a compelling government interest to
justify the statute. 163 In another declaratory judgment action, the
Nashville Court of Appeals in Campbell likewise determined that
Tennessee's homosexual sodomy act' 64 violated plaintiffs' 165 state
constitutional right to privacy.166 In a third declaratory judgment
action, the Supreme Court of Montana held in Gryczan that the
state's homosexual sodomy statute167 violated plaintiffs' 168 state
162 See State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. App. 1992), rev'd, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.
1994) (noting that appellees claimed that the law "violated their rights of privacy, equal pro-
tection, and due process of law"). Section 21.06 "Homosexual Conduct," from the Texas Penal
Code, provides as follows: "(a) A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex. An offense under this section is a Class
C misdemeanor." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1989).
Section 21.01(1) defines "Deviate sexual intercourse" as follows: "(A) any contact between
any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.01(1) (West 1989).
163 See Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 205. The Court of Appeals did not address plaintiffs'
claims that the statute violated the state due process and equal protection guarantees. See
id. The Texas Supreme Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. See State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. 1994).
164 The Homosexual Practices Act, § 39-13-510 (1991) provided: "It is a Class C misde-
meanor for any person to engage in consensual sexual penetration, as defined in § 39-13-
501(7), with a person of the same gender." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991).
Section 39-13-501(7) provided: "'Sexual penetration' means sexual intercourse, cunnilin-
gus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a per-
son's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim's, the defendant's, or
any other person's body, but emission of semen is not required .... " TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-501(7) (1991).
165 Five plaintiffs filed for declaratory judgment and to enjoin enforcement of the Act.
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The plaintiffs alleged
standing based on the following:
Each of the plaintiffs admitted that they have violated the HPA [Homosexual Practices
Act] in the past, and that they intend to continue violating the HPA in the future.
Plaintiffs allege that they are each harmed by the HPA because it criminalizes their
private, intimate conduct, and that... [it] could result in plaintiffs losing their jobs, pro-
fessional licenses, and/or housing should they be convicted.
Id.
166 See Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 262 (neglecting to address whether there was an equal
protection violation).
167 Montana's "Deviate Sexual Conduct" statute provided:
(1) A person who knowingly engages in deviate sexual relations or who causes another
to engage in deviate sexual relations commits the offense of deviate sexual conduct.
(2) A person convicted of the offense of deviate sexual conduct shall be imprisoned in
the state prison for any term not to exceed 10 years or be fined an amount not to exceed
$50,000, or both.
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right to privacy.169 Wasson involved a criminal charge for solicita-
tion of sodomy. 170 Jeffrey Wasson was arrested after' he invited an
undercover police officer home for consensual "deviate sexual inter-
course."171 The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the ho-
mosexual sodomy statute, which "punishes 'deviate sexual inter-
course' with another person of the same sex," violated Wasson's
state constitutional privacy and equal protection guarantees.
172
Each case will be examined to consider how these state sodomy
decisions subvert the straight mind in rejecting the law of the fa-
ther, i.e., the authority of the United States Constitution and Bow-
ers, in favor of state constitutions, which are found to offer greater
protection. In rejecting Bowers, these decisions reinterpret the law
to privilege private rights over public rights. Thus, for instance, the
Kentucky court in Wasson focused solely on the Kentucky Constitu-
tion and found that it offered greater protection of the right of pri-
vacy and equal protection than provided by the United States Con-
stitution.173 To reach this holding, the court determined that the
Kentucky Bill of Rights 174 was textually more explicit than the Fed-
(3) The fact that a person seeks testing or receives treatment for the HIV-related virus
or another sexually transmitted disease may not be used as a basis for a prosecution
under this section and is not admissible in evidence in a prosecution under this section.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1997). Section 45-2-101(2) defined "deviate sexual relations"
as "sexual contact or sexual intercourse between two persons of the same sex or any form of
sexual intercourse with an animal." Id. § 45-2-101(2).
168 Three men and three women filed the declaratory judgment action alleging that they
were homosexuals and that "they have in the past and intend in the future to engage in con-
duct that violates" the Deviate Sexual Conduct statute. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 115-
16 (Mont. 1997).
169 See id. at 126. The Montana Supreme Court also held that the plaintiffs had standing,
but declined to decide whether the statute infringed on plaintiffs' "dignity as human beings,"
discriminated against them on the basis of sex, or denied them equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 115.
170 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1993).
171 Id. The recitation of facts states that "[n]o money was offered or solicited." Id. at 489.
172 Id. at 488. Kentucky's Sodomy in the Fourth Degree § 510.100 provided:
(1) A person is guilty of sodomy in the fourth degree when he engages in deviate sex
ual intercourse with another person of the same sex.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 510.020, consent of the other person shall
not be a defense under this section, nor shall lack of consent of the other person be an
element of this offense.
(3) Sodomy in the fourth degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1990).
173 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491-92 ("[W]e hold the guarantees of individual liberty pro-
vided in our 1891 Kentucky Constitution offer greater protection of the right of privacy than
provided by the Federal Constitution .... ").
174 The relevant sections included the following:
§ 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable
rights, among which may be reckoned:
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eral Bill of Rights, and that "[b]oth the record of the 1890-91 de-
bates and the opinions of Justices of this Court who were the con-
temporaries of our founding fathers express protection of individual
liberties significantly greater than the selective list of rights ad-
dressed by the Federal Bill of Rights."175
Although the Kentucky Constitution does not mention a "right to
privacy," the court construed the state constitutional debates to im-
plicitly protect the right to privacy. 176 From a deconstructive view-
point, the court's analysis rewrites or reinterprets the constitu-
tional debate rather than discovering the intent of the founding
fathers, state justices, or delegates. Unlike Bowers' emphasis on a
historical survey of statutes criminalizing sodomy, Wasson's histori-
cal review of the constitutional convention comes to an opposite
conclusion by privileging private rights over public rights.177 Was-
son quoted the remark of one delegate that
"with the whole of such power [of an organized society] re-
siding in the people, the people as a body rest under the
highest of all moral obligations to protect each individual in
the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, pro-
vided that he shall in no wise injure his neighbor in so do-
ing."178
Another delegate argued that 'majorities cannot and ought not ex-
ercise arbitrary power over the minority.'"'179 Although Wasson re-
wrote history to reach a different conclusion from Bowers, Wasson
is not necessarily just, nor does it necessarily subvert the straight
mind, as argued below.
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Third: the right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
§ 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists
nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.
Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, §§ 1, 2 (1891).
175 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494.
176 See id. The court noted that the concept of a right to privacy arose only after the
"disseminat[ion]" of the famous article by Brandeis and Warren, The Rights of Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890), but that "[tihe ideas Brandeis and Warren expressed in that Arti-
cle as the 'right of privacy' were neither unique to the authors nor confined to the Harvard
Law School. They were an expression of contemporary thought." Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at
494.
177 See id. at 495 (finding that privacy rights have "been recognized as an integral part of
the guarantee of liberty in our 1891 Kentucky Constitution since its inception").
178 Id. at 494.
179 Id.
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In addition to relying on the constitutional debates, Wasson relied
on the 1909 case of Commonwealth v. Campbell'80 to support the
conclusion that "Kentucky has a rich and compelling tradition of
recognizing and protecting individual rights from state intru-
sion."18 Whereas the United States Supreme Court rejected any
connection between Bowers and cases such as Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe 8 2 involving issues of sexual intimacy, the Kentucky court
found great similarities between Wasson and Campbell, which in-
volved an ordinance that prohibited an individual from possessing
"intoxicating liquor, even for 'private use.'"
83
The chief similarity the Kentucky court saw between the two
cases stemmed from the characterization of sodomy and Prohibition
as the "great moral issue[s] of [their] time." 18 4 Even though the
Campbell court believed that "drinking was immoral,"18 5 it held
that the ordinance violated the Kentucky Bill of Rights: "'let a man
therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his
practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not
offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of
human laws. 1 86 The Wasson court applied this rationale to sodomy
prohibitions and also cited with approval the argument in Campbell
that "[u]nder our institutions there is no room for that inquisitorial
and protective spirit which seeks to regulate the conduct of men in
matters in themselves indifferent, and to make them conform to a
standard, not of their own choosing, but the choosing of the law-
giver."18 7 Thus, up to this point, Wasson has focused on questions of
liberty and democracy, but has not directly subverted the straight
mind.
Wasson directly rejected the straight mind's oppression of the
homosexual other when it rejected the Commonwealth's argument
that Bowers controlled the outcome. 88 Wasson rejected the state's
180 117 S.W. 383, 387 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909) (holding that the legislature does not have the
authority to prohibit a citizen from having intoxicating liquors in his possession for his own
use, as long as the use is without "direct injury to the public").
1s1 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 492.
182 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 ("It is obvious to us that neither of these
formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consen-
sual sodomy.").
1s3 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494.
184 Id. at 495.
185 Id.
188 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909)).
187 Id. (quoting Campbell, 117 S.W. at 387).
188 See id. at 493 (noting that "state constitutional jurisprudence in this area is not lim-
ited by the constraints inherent in federal due process analysis").
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claim of power "to criminalize sexual activity it deems immoral,"189
pithily asserting that "[t]he majority has no moral right to dictate
how everyone else should live." 190 Although Wasson could easily
have rejected Bowers without critiquing it, Wasson labeled Bowers
"a misdirected application of the theory of original intent" as evi-
denced by its contradiction of the reasoning and outcome of Lov-
ing.'9' According to Wasson, a court should take into account a
"contemporary, enlightened interpretation of the liberty interest in-
volved in the sexual act" in order to overrule outdated statutes
based on majority morals. 92 Indeed, Wasson registered its ap-
proval of other cases, including Morales, that rejected Bowers, and
used these other cases as evidence of a judicial trend: "[t]hus our
decision, rather than being the leading edge of change, is but a part
of the moving stream."193 Following Foucault's analysis, the reason
these decisions are part of a moving stream is that they are merely
one part of the discursive practices concerning sodomy prohibitions.
Returning to the use of Stevens' poem as a metaphor for the two
different analyses of the right to privacy, Bowers and Wasson di-
verge by privileging different binary terms. Bowers privileges the
moral law of public rights in order to build a "nave" reinscribing the
straight mind. Wasson privileges the "immoral law" (from the per-
spective of a high-toned old Christian woman) of private rights to
build a "peristyle" subverting the straight mind. Although Wasson's
rejection of the Federal Constitution represents a subversion of the
law of the father, the analysis is not free from totalizing gestures,
such as the desire to expose law's foundations. For instance, in
privileging the private over the public, Wasson's equal protection
argument was based on section three of the Kentucky Constitution,
which states: "[a]ll men, when they form a social compact, are
equal."19
4
The very notion of men forming a social compact is suspect, how-
ever, because from whence came the authority to form a represen-
189 Id. at 490.
190 Id. at 496.
191 Id. at 497. The Wasson court contrasted Bowers with Loving by pointing out that al-
though "[ilt is highly unlikely that protecting the rights of persons of different races to copu-
late was one of the considerations behind the Fourteenth Amendment," the United States
Supreme Court still held in Loving that the statute prohibiting miscegenation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 498.
194 Id. at 491.
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tative democracy based on a social compact? 195 According to Der-
rida, any myth of origins is suspect because from our present his-
torical perspective we cannot conclusively determine, for instance,
what the founding fathers intended. 196 At most, the grounding of
the law is a legitimate fiction. In following Derrida, this analysis
"wants to bring out.., the moment of authoritarian appeal-the
recourse to an ultimate, legitimizing power-involved in all such
fabulous myths of origin."197 For instance, this myth of origins and
of authority is perpetuated in judicial interpretation when the Ken-
tucky court purports to interpret what its constitutional framers in-
tended by section three, "All men, when they form a social compact,
are equal.. ." and what they intended by section two, "Absolute
and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."198
The court's authoritative interpretation of the framers' intent is,
under a deconstructive view, a false pretense, because meaning is
indeterminate. Furthermore, the interpretation of the framers' in-
tent is problematic because, as Derrida argued in Otobiographies,
even the framers' legitimacy is in question: "what entitled those
first delegates to speak on behalf of an American people whose con-
sent they could only assume by administrative fiat, since as yet
there existed no written constitution in which it was enshrined?"' 99
Regarding the equal protection challenge, the Wasson court re-
fused to speculate whether the United States Supreme Court would
consider homosexuals a protected class, but held, "[tihey are a
separate and identifiable class for Kentucky constitutional law
analysis because no class of persons can be discriminated against
under the Kentucky Constitution. All are entitled to equal treat-
ment, unless there is a substantial governmental interest, a ra-
tional basis, for different treatment."200 Although extending protec-
195 "[Derridean deconstruction] does not purport to stand on the outside and judge since it
can never discover that non-contrived outside measure." Collins, supra note 57, at 237.
196 See NORRIs, supra note 59, at 195-96 (discussing the debate surrounding the intentions
of the framers of the Constitution).
197 Id. at 198.
198 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491.
199 NORRIS, supra note 59, at 196.
200 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500 (emphasis added). The state's equal protection provisions
include Section Two and Three of the Kentucky Constitution, which provide: "Absolute and
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic,
not even in the largest majority." KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 2 (1891).
All men, when they form a social compact, are equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate
public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in con-
sideration of public services; but no property shall be exempt from taxation except as
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tion to homosexuals as a separate class refuses to oppress homo-
sexuals as "other," the conclusion that "no class ... can be discrimi-
nated against"201 should alleviate the necessity of declaring any
group a separate class. The court's reasoning ignores this internal
contradiction which undermines a subversion of the straight mind.
In ruling on the Commonwealth's asserted interests to legitimize
the statute, the decision successfully subverts the straight mind
concept that heterosexuality constitutes a singularity. Wasson in-
dicated that "[m]any of the claimed justifications are simply outra-
geous: that 'homosexuals are more promiscuous than heterosexu-
als ... that homosexuals enjoy the company of children, and that
homosexuals are more prone to engage in sex acts in public."'
20 2
The one "superficial[ly] valid[ ]" justification the decision analyzed
concerns the spread of infectious diseases. 203 However, the court
rejected this justification on the basis that AIDS and other sexual
diseases are spread by unprotected sexual contact, whether homo-
sexual or heterosexual. 204 The court held that it could find "no leg-
islative purpose to this statute except to single out homosexuals for
different treatment for indulging their sexual preference by engag-
ing in the same activity heterosexuals are now at liberty to per-
form."20 5 Finally, the Wasson court again critiqued Bowers and the
United States Supreme Court by purporting to carry out "the
unique goal to which all humanity aspires" and which is inscribed
above the United States Supreme Court entrance: "Equal Justice
Under Law."20 6 Wasson proudly exclaimed "[iln Kentucky it is more
than a mere aspiration."20 7 This exclamation is ironic because jus-
tice is merely aspiration and law's meaning is always deferred.
Gryczan also aspired to justice in interpreting the Montana Con-
stitution to strike down the state's homosexual sodomy statute. In
concluding that the state constitution provided broader protection
provided in this Constitution, and every grant of a franchise, privilege or exemption,
shall remain subject to revocation, alteration or amendment.
Id. § 3.
201 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500.
202 Id. at 501; see Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the Per-
petuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341, 342-45 (1995) (exploring
how "homophobic attitudes pervade judicial decisions").
203 Id.
204 See id. ("The growing number of females to whom AIDS ... has been transmitted is
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of the right to privacy than did the Federal Constitution,208 the
court rejected the state's argument that Bowers resolved the issue,
and instead, applied the privacy test articulated in Katz v. United
States.20 9 Concluding that "all adults regardless of gender, fully
and properly expect that their consensual sexual activities will not
be subject to the prying eyes of others or to governmental snooping
or regulation," the court held that the first prong of the Katz test
was met.210 The second prong likewise was fulfilled because society
recognized the privacy expectation as reasonable, even if it did "not
approve of the sexual practices of homosexuals."
211
In addition to its somewhat unique application of the Katz test,
the court concluded that even under the Palko-derived test extend-
ing the right to privacy "only to those rights which are fundamental
or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," the statute implicated
the right to privacy because Montana's Constitution explicitly pro-
tected "personal-autonomy privacy protection as a fundamental
right," and because "it is hard to imagine any activities that adults
would consider more fundamental, more private and, thus, more
deserving of protection from governmental interference than non-
commercial, consensual adult sexual activity."212 In rejecting the
state's argument that the 1972 Constitutional Convention dele-
gates' refusal to add a provision that "[p]rivate sexual acts between
consenting adults do not constitute a crime" indicated the delegates'
intent not to protect consensual sodomy, the court pointed out that
the intent of the delegates was not recorded, and that the refusal to
add the provision could just as likely indicate that "the delegates
believed [private sexual acts were] already protected under the pri-
vacy clause."2
13
208 See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997). The court noted that "we have
long held that Montana's Constitution affords citizens broader protection of their right to
privacy than does the federal constitution." Id. at 121. The'specific constitutional provision
that provides an explicit right to privacy provides: "[r]ight of privacy. The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
209 See Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 121-22 (rejecting the Bowers test of whether statute
"'violate[s] those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions,"'" in favor of the Katz privacy test: "'first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable'"").
210 Id. at 122.
211 Id. at 122 (remarking that "[q]uite simply, consenting adults expect that neither the
state nor their neighbors will be co-habitants of their bedrooms").
212 Id. at 123.
213 Id.
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Gryczan next analyzed the state's two asserted government inter-
ests, protecting health by preventing the spread of AIDS and pro-
tecting public morals, and found that neither was compelling.214
This part of the court's analysis clearly rejects the straight mind by
pointing out the "faulty logic and invalid assumptions" underlying
the first interest, and the tension between public morals and indi-
vidual privacy underlying the second interest. 215 Noting that the
statute was enacted in 1973, "almost ten years before the first AIDS
case was detected in Montana," and that AIDS is spread by contact
other than same-gender sexual contact, the court rejected the as-
serted government interest in preventing the spread of AIDS as
based on faulty rationales. 21 6 Moreover, the court held that the
statute was not narrowly tailored to prevent the spread of AIDS be-
cause it prohibited conduct "unrelated to the spread of HIV," such
as "touching, caressing and kissing," and because it prohibited con-
duct between two people with the HIV virus, or between two people
practicing "safe sex."21 7
The court next rejected the second asserted government interest,
protecting public morals. 218 In a lengthy discussion balancing the
competing interests of the legislature to make public policy and of
the state constitution to limit that power, the court pointed out that
the legislature's power "to regulate morals and to enact laws re-
flecting moral choices is not without limits." 21 9 Specifically, in rhet-
orically charged language, the court stated:
[o]ur Constitution does not protect morality; it does, how-
ever, guarantee to all persons, whether in the majority or in
a minority, those certain basic freedoms and rights which
are set forth in the Declaration of Rights, not the least of
which is the right of individual privacy. Regardless that
majoritarian morality may be expressed in the public-policy
pronouncements of the legislature, it remains the obligation
of the courts--and of this court in particular--to scrupulously
214 See id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 124. The decision points out that "[s]exual contact between women has an ex-
tremely low risk of HIV transmission" and that "heterosexual contact is now the leading
mode of HIV transmission in this country." Id.
217 Id. The court also noted that the statute was counter-productive to "public education
and disease prevention efforts" because that statute "caused individuals to conceal or distort
relevant information." Id.
218 See id.
219 Id. at 125.
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support, protect and defend those rights and liberties guar-
anteed to all persons under our Constitution.
220
Furthermore, the court privileged individual rights protected by the
state constitution, especially the fundamental right of individual
privacy, and emphasized "Montanans' historical abhorrence and
distrust of excessive governmental interference in their personal
lives," relying on James Madison's caution against a tyranny of the
majority and C.S. Lewis' warning that "[i]t may be better to live
under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies."
221
Like the other state decisions that reject Bowers, Gryczan "take[s]/
The opposing law and make[s] a peristyle,"222 that refuses the
straight mind's "nave."
In reaching the same result as Wasson and Gryczan the Tennes-
see Court of Appeals in Campbell determined that the right of pri-
vacy protected by the Tennessee Declaration of Rights exceeded the
federal right.2 Although the declaratory judgment limited the
facts to "private, consensual, non-commercial, sexual conduct," the
Campbell decision granted greater privacy protection under the
Tennessee Constitution than available under the Federal Constitu-
tion.224 Rather than performing an historical analysis of past cases
or constitutional debates, Campbell reinterpreted a case decided
four years earlier, Davis v. Davis, which "first expressly recognized"
a right to privacy embedded in the state constitution. 225 According
to the facts and holding recited in Campbell, Davis involved a de-
termination of the parental rights of a divorced couple to frozen
embryos; Mrs. Davis wanted to donate the embryos to another cou-
ple, but Mr. Davis did not want the embryos donated because that
"would... force him to become a father against his will."226 In de-
termining the parameters of the state right to privacy, the court in
Davis held that Mr. Davis did indeed have a right to prevent his ex-
220 Id.
221 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961),
and C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK 287, 292
(1970)).
222 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 77.
223 See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on
Davis's holding that the source of the right to privacy emanated from "sections 3, 7, 19, and
27 of the Declaration of Rights contained in Article I" of the Tennessee Constitution).
224 Id. at 259.
225 Id. (analyzing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)).
226 Id. at 260.
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wife's donation of frozen embryos because the "right to privacy...
included the right not to procreate."227
Campbell's holding extended Davis to emphasize the "strong his-
toric commitment by the citizens of this State to individual liberty
and freedom from governmental interference in their personal
lives."228 Quoting Davis's holding that this strong liberty interest
"is so deeply imbedded in the Tennessee Constitution that it, alone
among American constitutions, gives the people, in the face of gov-
ernmental oppression.., the right to resist that oppression even to
the extent of overthrowing the government,"229 Campbell, like Was-
son, valorizes private over public, and especially emphasizes "[t]he
sanctity of the home"230 in extending the right to privacy to include
the "right to engage in consensual and noncommercial sexual activi-
ties in the privacy of that adult's home... [even] when the adults
engaging in that private activity are of the same gender."231 By
privileging private rights, these cases demonstrate the impossible
reconciliation between private other and public self.23 2
The effect of Campbell's holding up to this point, extending the
state right to privacy to include homosexual sodomy, subverts the
straight mind by including homosexual sodomy within the category
of intimate sexual activities. The second half of the decision, which
weighs the state's asserted compelling interests, also unsettles het-
erosexual presumptions. 233 The court quickly disposed of the first
compelling state interest: "the statute discourages activity which
cannot lead to procreation."234 Citing Griswold and Davis, the court
held that sexual activity is constitutionally protected even if it does
not result in procreation. 23 5 The second asserted compelling inter-
est is that the statute "discourages a socially stigmatized lifestyle
which leads to higher rates of suicide, depression, and substance
227 Id. (noting the holding of Davis).
228 Id. at 261.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 262.
232 The Wasson dissent underscores this failure when it criticizes the judgment: "It is
ironic that in the rambling rhetoric of over 9,000 words, the majority opinion blithely tram-
ples on the rights of the majority of the public." Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 510 (Wintersheimer,
J., dissenting).
233 See Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 258 (discussing privacy rights afforded to individuals un-
der Tennessee's Constitution).
234 Id. at 263.
235 See id. (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Griswold "establish[ed] that
the State cannot outlaw certain intimate sexual activities of its citizens simply because those
activities do not or cannot lead to procreation").
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abuse."23 6 In rejecting these straight mind assumptions, the court
stated "there is no one 'homosexual lifestyle' in which all or even a
majority of homosexuals engage."2
7
For the same reason, the court rejected the third interest that
"homosexual relationships are instable," "short lived, shallow, and
promiscuous."N8 In considering the state's fourth asserted interest,
that the statute "prevents the spread of infectious disease,"239 the
court held that the statute is not narrowly tailored because the
statute prohibits homosexuals from engaging in sex even if both
partners are disease free or practicing safe sex. 240 Moreover, the
court agreed with the amicus curiae brief of the American Public
Health Association "that the statute is actually counterproductive
to public health goals" because homosexuals are reluctant to seek
medical treatment for sexual diseases since they fear being re-
ported and prosecuted. 241 Finally, the court rejected the state's fifth
compelling interest, that the statute furthers public morals, by
holding that the interest is not compelling enough to prohibit pri-
vate sexual conduct between adults who "happen to be of the same
gender."242 Like Wasson and Gryczan, the court in Campbell sub-
verts the straight mind by rejecting its assumptions that hetero-
sexuality is "natural" and that it entails "the rigid obligation of the
reproduction of the 'species,' that is, the reproduction of heterosex-
ual society."243 These decisions reject the obligation that "'you-will-
be-straight-or-you-will-not-be."'
244
Likewise, in Morales the Texas appellate court subverts this obli-
gation to be straight. The first sentence of the decision casts the is-
sue in the following terms: "[t]his appeal involves the limits on the
government's right to intrude into an individual's private life, and





240 See id. (recognizing, however, that "the State certainly has a compelling interest in
preventing the spread of infectious disease among its citizens").
241 Id. at 264.
242 Id. at 265.
243 WrTrIG, supra note 6, at 6.
244 Id. at 28.
245 State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.
1994). The decision echoes the way Justice Blackmun framed the issue in Bowers: "this case
is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,'
namely, 'the right to be let alone.'" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (Blackmun, J.,
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lishing that the Texas Constitution provides greater constitutional
protection for the right to privacy than does the Federal Constitu-
tion,246 the court extended the right to privacy to homosexual con-
duct by short-circuiting possible objections. Unlike the court's
analysis in Bowers, Morales did not evaluate whether homosexual
conduct is deeply rooted in tradition, nor did Morales analogize
other cases extending the right to privacy. Rather, in rhetorically
clear and concise language, the court held:
we can think of nothing more fundamentally private and de-
serving of protection than sexual behavior between con-
senting adults in private. If consenting adults have a pri-
vacy right to engage in sexual behavior, then it cannot be
constitutional, absent a compelling state objective, to pro-
hibit lesbians and gay men from engaging in the same con-
duct in which heterosexuals may legally engage. In short,
the State cannot make the same conduct criminal when done
by one, and innocent when done by the other.
247
The court then rejected the State's only offered compelling inter-
est, public morality, by concluding that the State had failed to dem-
onstrate "that criminalizing private conduct engaged in by con-
senting adults in any way advances public morality."248 The
language of the decision refuses to implement the straight mind's
domination over the homosexual other by casting the issue not in
binary terms (homosexual/heterosexual), but rather in terms of "an
individual[ ]" or "consenting adult[ ]."249 In effect, Morales rejected
the definition in Bowers equating homosexuality with sodomy.
The next Part of this Article considers ethical concerns raised by
Bowers and by the straight mind's insistence on sodomy laws, and
finally, concludes by returning to Wasson, Campbell, Gryczan, and
Morales to challenge their degree of success in subverting the
straight mind.
dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting)).
246 See Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 204 (concluding that "the federal constitution provides only
a floor below which the State may not fall in affording protection to individuals"). The deci-
sion relies on Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retar-
dation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987) which involved a challenge to mandatory polygraph tests
of state employees and determined the parameters of the state constitutional right to privacy
found in sections 6, 8, 9, 10, 19, and 25 of the Texas Bill of Rights.
247 Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 204.
248 Id. at 205.
249 Id. at 202, 205.
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V. "PROUD OF SUCH NOVELTIES OF THE SUBLIME" 250: ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Contrary to the view that deconstruction is arbitrary,251 Christo-
pher Norris, an acknowledged authority on Derrida, defends Der-
rida's enterprise as having a non-arbitrary and "ultimately ethical
nature."25 2 A few examples illustrate Norris's claim. For instance,
Plato's Pharmacy announces that "the question of writing opens as
a question of morality,"253 and Force of Law argues that
"deconstructionist" texts "seem... not to foreground the theme of
justice" but "this is only apparently so."254 An overall concern of
Force of Law is the question of justice. Similarly, although a decon-
structive approach to sodomy cases has been taken, this Article at-
tempts to disabuse any notion that deconstruction only results in
nihilist and relativistic conclusions. The analysis matters from a
pragmatic standpoint because of the ethical conclusions and politi-
cal ramifications that are drawn in these concluding sections. As
Butler asks in her book, "[w]hat happens to the subject and to the
stability of gender categories when the epistemic regime of pre-
sumptive heterosexuality is unmasked as that which produces and
reifies these ostensible categories of ontology?"255 Parts III and IV
attempt to de-center Bowers' compulsory heterosexuality. This Part
critiques the ethical consequences of Bowers' straight mind.
Several ethical questions are raised in these cases. One concerns
the question of violence, both the violence Derrida and Robert Cover
see as inseparable from the enforcement of law and also homopho-
bic violence. Law, and law's enforcement, require violence. As Der-
rida points out, "there is no law without enforceability." 25 6 The
question becomes: when is this force legitimate?257  Cover has
similarly argued that "[1]egal interpretive acts signal and occasion
the imposition of violence upon others."258 The violence of enforcing
250 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 78.
251 See, e.g., Alexander Nehamas, Truth and Consequences: How to Understand Jacques
Derrida, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 1987, 31, 32-33 (discussing the controversy surrounding
Derrida's theories).
252 NORRIS, supra note 59, at 230.
253 DERRIDA, supra note 5, at 74.
254 Derrida, supra note 67, at 7.
255 BUTLER, supra note 41, at viii.
256 Derrida, supra note 67, at 6; see infra Part II (discussing deconstruction generally).
257 See Derrida, supra note 67, at 6 (contemplating: "What is a just force or a non-violent
force").
258 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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sodomy statutes is an illegitimate or unjust force because it imposes
punishment for private sexual behavior. Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Bowers suggested this violence when he raised the
possibility of invalidating the Georgia statute under the Eighth
Amendment, not because of homophobic violence, but because of the
overly long sentence (up to twenty years) for a sodomy conviction.
25 9
Another form of violence associated with sodomy laws is homo-
phobic violence. For instance, in recounting the "untold" facts of
Bowers, Kendall Thomas described Hardwick's beating three weeks
after his original arrest (for drinking in public) by three men who
may have been plainclothes officers. 260 The Bowers Court failed to
address this problem of violence that straight mind morals could
engender;261 however, the Morales and Gryczan courts did acknowl-
edge homophobic violence in their standing analyses. 262 The Mo-
rales court held that one reason plaintiffs had standing and were
entitled to equitable relief was that the Texas sodomy statute not
only criminalized behavior but encouraged hate crimes and dis-
crimination. 263 Regrettably, the Texas Supreme Court rejected this
conclusion and noted that "none of the plaintiffs alleges having been
the victim of a hate crime, or a fear of becoming the victim of any
259 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
"a prison sentence for such conduct-certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a se-
rious Eighth Amendment issue"). Four years after Bowers was decided, Justice Powell re-
marked that he "probably made a mistake" in ruling with the majority. Linda Greenhouse,
When Second Thoughts in Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14; Ruth Mar-
cus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3.
260 See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1438
(1992) (describing Hardwick's account of his attack: "I got out of the car, turned around, and
they said 'Michael' and I said yes, and they proceeded to beat the hell out of me"). Derrida
discusses police violence in Force of Law, arguing that modern police are "ignoble" because,
using violence, they both enforce the law and make the law. Derrida, supra note 67, at 42-
43.
261 As discussed below, the Supreme Court later considered this problem of violence, or
.animus" in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see infra notes 294-98 and accompa-
nying text. The recent killing of Matthew Shepard, a gay student at the University of Wyo-
ming, tragically illustrates this homophobic violence, which studies indicate has increased
nationally by two percent in 1997. See Elaine Herscher, Wyoming Death Echoes Rising Anti-
Gay Attacks, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1998, at A7.
262 See State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 202-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 869 S.W.2d
941 (Tex. 1994) (concluding that a Texas sodomy statute had the practical effect of "caus[ing]
actual harm which goes far beyond the mere threat of prosecution"); see also Gryczan v.
State, 942 P.2d 112, 120 (Mont. 1997) (relying on evidence by the National Institute for Jus-
tice "show[ing] that there is a correlation between homosexual sodomy laws and homophobic
violence").
263 See id. (noting that gay men and lesbians suffered actual harm and did not have an
adequate legal remedy).
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specific threatened future event."264 However, as Butler points out,
violence can occur when one is named, a "sodomite" in this case, be-
cause of the "power of the name": "[o]ne is ... brought into social
location and time through being named." 265 Here, the moral major-
ity (a high-toned old Christian woman) names or constitutes a sub-
ject: "It]he mark interpellation makes is not descriptive, but inau-
gurative. It seeks to introduce a reality rather than report on an
existing one." 266 As an inaugurative act, this naming can be a vio-
lence when the subject does not want a particular signification.
After all, to be named by another is traumatic: it is an act
that precedes my will... . Because I have been called some-
thing, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself
through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never
quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The
terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we
choose. 267
Thus, the force of law, by enforcing sodomy statutes, constitutes an
act of violence-both in naming and criminalizing sexual behavior
as deviant, and in enforcing sodomy statutes.
Thomas, who has examined the relation between homophobic
violence and sodomy laws, argues that the reason courts have a
duty to prevent
violence against gays and lesbians perpetrated by other citi-
zens represents the states' constructive delegation of gov-
ernmental power to these citizens.... To state the point in
slightly different terms, the fact that homophobic violence
occurs within the context of "private" relations by no means
implies that such violence is without "public" origins or con-
sequence.268
Thomas argues that because this "homophobic violence is an exer-
cise of political power,"269 its very existence may be a way to invali-
date sodomy statutes under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.270
264 State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994).
265 JUDITH BUTLER, ExCITABLE SPEECH 29 (1997).
266 Id. at 33.
267 Id. at 38.
268 Thomas, supra note 260, at 1481-82.
269 Id. at 1469.
270 See id. at 1486-88 (noting that the criminalization of homosexual sodomy functions as
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment). Additionally, as pointed out above, Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Bowers raised the possibility of invalidating the Georgia stat-
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A second ethical feature is the catch-22 dilemma created by the
state's failure to enforce sodomy statutes.271 That sodomy statutes
are rarely enforced (except as additional charges in a rape case)
presents the problem that behavior that is widely tolerated is none-
theless criminal. This illustrates Foucault's description of the mul-
tiple discourses regarding sodomy as a "twofold operation" of ex-
treme severity and tolerance. 272 Moreover, an unenforced statute
carries the possibility of what Cover calls a violent interpretation of
law, the threat that one may be prosecuted. 273 Ironically, as a re-
sult of the failure to prosecute, individuals may lack standing to
challenge the statute, but are nonetheless "irreparabl[y] injured]
simply from the statute's existence."274
A third ethical problem lies in the enforcement of majority morals
to the exclusion of an ethics of care for the other. As argued in the
first section of this Article, cases such as Bowers, which uphold sod-
omy laws, often do so based on an explicit enforcement of majority
morals. Conversely, courts that have ruled sodomy statutes uncon-
stitutional have done so by ignoring or explicitly rejecting majority
morals. The split between majority and minority morals reflects a
failure of reconciliation between self and other, or stated another
way, demonstrates a failure to care for the other. Justice is not
possible unless we enforce the law by taking the other into account.
ute under the Eighth Amendment. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that an imprisonment term of 20 years for a single act of consensual
homosexual sodomy could constitute cruel and unusual punishment). The issue of cruel
punishment was also raised in the lower court level in Wasson, but was not discussed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court because it was not preserved for appellate review. See Common-
wealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1993) (noting the decision not to review).
271 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (noting that "there had been no reported decision in-
volving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades"
and that the state had "declined to present the criminal charge against Hardwick to a grand
jury"); id. at 219 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mentioning that the Georgia Attorney Gen-
eral stated at oral argument that the last prosecution he could remember under the statute
was in the 1930s or 1940s); see also Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 117, 120 (Mont. 1997)
(rejecting the State's argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing, in part, because there had
been no prosecutions under the statute since it was enacted).
272 See 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 101 (discussing the phenomenon of severe punish-
ment yet infrequent enforcement).
273 See Cover, supra note 258, at 1601 (noting the detrimental effect legal interpretation
can have on peoples' lives).
274 City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. App. 1993). Decided on the same
basis as Morales, England concerned a challenge to the Texas sodomy statute brought by a
lesbian police officer who had been denied the processing of her employment application. See
id. at 959 (noting that "England, who was prevented from completing the job application
process with the Dallas Police Department, has actually suffered the concrete injury that the
plaintiffs in Morales alleged they would suffer"). After this intermediate level judgment, the
State did not file an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.
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Several French contemporary critical theorists have urged an
ethics of care. For instance, the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas
describes an ethics of alterity in which being or selfhood is "the re-
sponsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other." 275 For Levinas,
what it means to be human and responsible is to act in response to
the other: "being human is a concrete and physical sensitivity to
the claims revealed by the Other."276 The encounter with the other
is the heart of being; it is an ethical bond because "only by discov-
ering the irreducibility of the alterity of the Other can I understand
that I am neither solipsistically alone in the world nor part of a to-
tality to which all others also belong."277
Levinas' belief in law's ethical responsibility can be seen from his
statement that "[]ustice well ordered begins with the Other."278 He
believes that we are responsible to the extent that we consider the
other.27 9 Although Derrida has criticized Levinas, he has referred
to Levinas' ethics of alterity in his discussions on deconstruction
and the possibility of justice.280 During the Villanova roundtable,
for instance, Derrida stated:
Levinas says... that justice is the relation to the other....
Once you relate to the other as the other, then something in-
calculable comes on the scene ... That is what gives decon-
struction its movement.., to criticize the given determina-
tions of culture, of institutions, of legal systems, not in order
to destroy them or simply to cancel them, but to be just with
justice, to respect this relation to the other as justice. 281
Similarly, another French philosopher, H6lne Cixous, describes
the awareness and love for the other as "the mystery of pain and
275 EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ETHICS AND INFINITY: CONVERSATIONS WITH PHILIPPE NEMO 52
(Richard A. Cohen trans., 1985). Levinas, who has an "unmatched reputation" in France, is
considered to have "almost single-handedly restored philosophical respectability to ethics in
post-war French thought." COLIN DAVIS, LEVINAS: AN INTRODUCTION 47 (1996).
276 ADRIAAN PEPERZAK, To THE OTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EMMANUEL LEVINAS 26 (1993).
277 DAVIS, supra note 275, at 48.
278 PEPERZAK, supra note 276, at 112.
279 See id. at 116. Peperzak explains the importance for Levinas of the face of the other as
an indicator of injustice: "The Other's face is the revelation not of the arbitrariness of the
will but its injustice. Consciousness of my injustice is produced when I incline myself not
before facts, but before the Other." Id. at 116.
280 See DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 17-18 (noting Levinas's con-
struct of justice, and noting that Derrida commented that it was a very minimal definition
but one that he loved).
281 Id.
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compassion: in times of injustice, the 'subject' of pain is not me, but
you. Your pain makes my own more bitter and more generous."28 2
One difficulty of urging an ethics of care, or an ethics of alterity,
is the "unbridgeable separation of the self from the other," which
may be supplemented by an ethics of care, but which can never be
resolved because the "self always remains (somewhat) estranged
from the other."2 3 These limits of reconciliation do not dictate
against attempting an ethics of care, but rather, offer a hope for a
more ethical vision and "suggest to the about to be renewed ethical
call to the other which particular failures should be avoided, and
which obstacles need to be overcome."28 4
Thus, whereas the majority in Bowers relies on an application of
majority morals that rejects an ethics of care for the homosexual
other, cases such as Campbell incorporate an ethics of care, which
is informed by the awareness of the gap between self and other.
For instance, in Campbell, after a lengthy discussion of whether
majority morals provides a compelling state interest on which to
uphold the Tennessee sodomy law, the court reasoned that even
laws that "reflect 'moral choices' regarding [citizens'] standard of
conduct... have constitutional limits." 285 In overturning the sod-
omy statute as unconstitutional, the court applied an ethics of care
for the other. This ethics of care can be seen in the court's rationale
that
an adult's right to engage in consensual and noncommercial
sexual activities in the privacy of that adult's home is a mat-
ter of intimate personal concern which is at the heart of
Tennessee's protection of the right to privacy, and that this
right should not be diminished or afforded less constitutional
protection when the adults engaging in that private activity
are of the same gender.28 6
This protection of intimate privacy rights of homosexuals is itself a
moral choice, contrary to the court's assertion that it "'does not sit
as moral arbiters making judgments on what is acceptable social
behavior.'" 28 7
282 H6lne Cixous, We Who Are Free, Are We Free?, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201, 206 (Chris
Miller trans., 1993).
283 Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 158.
284 Id. at 159.
285 Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
286 Id. at 262.
287 Id. at 266 (quoting In re Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Tenn. App. 1995)).
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Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers also shows an ethic of care
when he argues that
[t]his case involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not
adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable
interest.., let alone an interest that can justify invading
the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live
their lives differently.
288
Blackmun's dissent also quotes Wisconsin v. Yoder's insight that
"'[a] way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is dif-
ferent.'" 28 9 The acknowledgment of difference and of "different
choices," 290 and the rejection of laws based on "'mere public intoler-
ance or animosity'"291 exemplify this ethics of care. Derrida under-
scores the importance for a state to acknowledge differences:
[a] state without plurality and a respect for plurality would
be, first, a totalitarian state, and not only is this a terrible
thing, but it does not work .... [A] state as such must be at-
tentive as much as possible to plurality, to the plurality of
peoples, of languages, cultures, ethnic groups, persons, and
so on. That is the condition for a state.
292
A more recent United States Supreme Court case demonstrating
plurality and an ethics of care is Romer v. Evans.293 Decided ten
years after Bowers, Romer invalidated Colorado's Constitutional
"Amendment 2," which the Court described as "prohibit[ing] all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local
government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall
refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians."294 Although
288 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
289 Id. at 206 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972)).
290 Id. Justice Blackmun's dissent reiterates this when he quotes West Virginia Board of
Education: "[fIreedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.'" Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)).
291 Id. at 212 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
292 DERRIDA, supra note 5, at 15.
293 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
294 Id. at 624. Article 2, section 30b of Colorado's Constitution, which was held unconsti-
tutional in Romer v. Evans, provided:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
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Romer did not involve the violation of or challenge to a sodomy
statute, many commentators have argued that Romer indicates a
shift in the Supreme Court's analysis of laws affecting homosexuals
indicating the willingness of the Court to reconsider its holding in
Bowers.295 This shift can be seen as an example of an ethics of car-
ing. Because the decision did not involve a sodomy statute and was
decided on the basis of equal protection rather than due process, it
will not be analyzed in great detail, but it is offered as a recent ex-
ample of an ethics of care.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion begins with a quote by the
first Justice Harlan that "the Constitution 'neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens."' 296 This quote sets the tone for an
ethics of alterity which plays out in the Court's determination that
"the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class it affects." 297 The Court's labeling of animus for the homo-
sexual other indicates a shift in Supreme Court analysis.298 The ex-
tent of the Supreme Court's shift is unclear in light of its recent de-
nial of petition for writ of certiorari in Equality Foundation of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.299 The city charter
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
295 See G. Sidney Buchanan, Sexual Orientation Classifications and the Ravages of Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 11, 90 (1996) (finding, however, that "it is still too early
to know whether Romer or Bowers will emerge as the dominant precedent in this area of the
law"); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 966-67 (noting that Romer's most noteworthy achievement
"was its failure to cite anything to which the continued vitality of Bowers could be moored");
see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In holding that homosexuality can-
not be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged
here, pronounced only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick ... and places the prestige of
this institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible
as racial or religious bias.").
296 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
297 Id. at 632; see id. at 634 (holding that "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevi-
table inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of per-
sons affected"). The dissent counters this with the argument that
one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for example, or polygamy, or
cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely that
is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the
same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we
held constitutional in Bowers.
Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299 See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 955.
299 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3749, 1998 WL 248349 (Oct. 13,
1998).
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amendment at issue in Equality Foundation was similar to the or-
dinance in Romer, however, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
charter amendment "was not facially animated solely by an imper-
missible naked desire of a majority of the City's residents to injure
an unpopular group of citizens."300 In a three-justice opinion re-
garding the denial for the petition for writ of certiorari, Justice Ste-
vens emphasized that "the denial.., is not ruling on the merits,"
and that "[this Court does not normally make an independent ex-
amination of state law questions that have been resolved by a court
of appeals."30' Despite the uncertainty that Equality Foundation
raises, with trends evidenced in state court decisions, it will be in-
teresting to see whether the same ethics of care will guide a future
due process challenge to a homosexual sodomy statute.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOTALIZING GESTURES, POSSIBLE SUBVERSIONS,
AND AN UNWEAVING
"Every thread of summer is at last unwoven," writes Stevens.
30 2
"[T]he dissimulation of the woven texture can in any case take cen-
turies to undo its web," writes Derrida.30 3 We do not have centu-
ries. One of the most troubling ethical threads involves the possi-
bility of justice. Bowers and these several state sodomy cases come
to opposite conclusions. Is either just? Law is not justice. Justice
is possible only when law makers and enforcers take into account
the other. And even then, Derrida argues that we can never be cer-
tain that any decision is just because the decision must go through
the "ordeal of the undecidable,"30 4 which then "remains caught,
lodged, at least as a ghost... in every decision" and "deconstructs
from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any sup-
300 Id. at 300. The court also distinguished the charter amendment from the ordinance in
Romer by holding that the charter amendment "did not disempower a group a citizens from
attaining special protection at all levels of state government, but instead merely removed
municipally enacted special protection from gays and lesbians." Id. at 301.
301 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 1998 WL 248349, at *1.
302 WALLACE STEVENS, Puella Parvula, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND, supra note
7, at 330.
303 DERRIDA, supra note 5, at 65.
304 Derrida, supra note 67, at 24. The ordeal of the undecidable involves the paradox that
[tihere is apparently no moment in which a decision can be called presently and fully
just: either it has not yet been made according to a rule, and nothing allows us to call it
just, or it has already followed a rule... which in its turn is not absolutely guaranteed
by anything; and, moreover, if it were guaranteed, the decision would be reduced to cal-
culation and we couldn't call it just.
Id.
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posed criteriology that would assure us of the justice" which is an
infinite idea, anyway.3 05 We can never re-create this ghost; we can
never guarantee original intention. Nor can we determine justice
as the foundation of the law. Derrida asks, "What is a legitimate
fiction? What does it mean to establish the truth of justice?"306 For
Stevens, "[p]oetry is the supreme fiction."30 7 The legitimate fiction
or supreme fiction turns out to be non-deconstructible justice. Both
the moral law and the immoral law can be deconstructed. As Der-
rida has explained:
[ejach time you replace one legal system by another one, one
law by another one.., that is a kind of deconstruction...
So, the law as such can be deconstructed and has to be de-
constructed.... But justice is not the law.... Without a call
for justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing
the law.30
8
This call for justice makes deconstruction of the law more than an
empty practice. Rather, it is a call to change injustice based on an
"'idea of justice'.., owed to the other."30 9 This change should "not [
I remain enclosed in purely speculative, theoretical, academic dis-
course but rather.., aspire to something more consequential, to
change things and to intervene in an efficient and responsible ...
way, not only in the profession but in what one calls the citg, the
polis and more generally the world."310
Setting aside these problematic and theoretical questions about
the relations between law and justice and deconstruction, this Arti-
cle will conclude with a more pragmatic question that "aspire[s] to
something more consequential":31' can state court cases that reject
their federal father be said to subvert the straight mind? The an-
swer is in part no, and in part yes. The answer depends on the
power of language to effect change in the epistemic hegemony of the
straight mind. Butler argues, "[t]he power of language to work on
bodies is both the cause of sexual oppression and the way beyond
305 Id. at 24-25. Collins raises an even more troubling aspect of Derrida's discussion of
justice-the possibility that the idea of justice may be "'reappropriated by the most perverse
calculation."' Collins, supra note 57, at 246 (quoting Derrida).
306 Derrida, supra note 67, at 12. Derrida's question responds to Montaign's comment
that "even our law, it is said, has legitimate fictions on which it founds the truth of its jus-
tice."' Id. (quoting Montaigne).
307 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 77.
308 DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 16-17.
309 Derrida, supra note 67, at 25.
310 Id. at 8-9.
311 Id. at 8.
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that oppression."312 Although both Wasson and Morales decrimi-
nalize homosexual sodomy, they both imply it is immoral.313 Thus,
the result in both cases might be considered just, but the means to
achieve that result does not necessarily demonstrate an ethics of
care for the other. In Wasson, the Commonwealth argued it had the
right to prohibit sodomy solely because it is immoral.3 14 The Ken-
tucky court did not subvert this power by saying sodomy is moral,
nor did the court subvert this power in oblique ways. Instead, the
court continued to call sodomy "Id]eviate sexual intercourse,"315 and
agreed that it was an "incendiary moral issue."31 6 In effect, Wasson
is an example of what it calls "an enlightened paternalism"-it may
be enlightened, but it is still the logos, the Father, the social con-
tract that is a heterosexual social contract because it validates the
straight mind's assumptions of procreation and heterosexuality.3 17
Similarly, the court of appeals' decision in Morales rejected the
State's assertion that it had power to criminalize homosexual sod-
omy solely on the basis of "implement[ing] . . . public morality."318
The decision also stated: "[we are mindful that homosexual con-
duct is abhorrent to the morals and deeply held belief of many peo-
ple."3 19 Unlike Wasson, however, Morales did not adopt the view
that homosexual sodomy is deviate behavior. Instead, Morales
stated:
[w]e can think of nothing more fundamentally private and
deserving of protection than sexual behavior between con-
senting adults in private. If consenting adults have a pri-
vacy right to engage in sexual behavior, then it cannot be
constitutional, absent a compelling state objective, to pro-
312 BUTLER, supra note 41, at 116.
313 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 499 (Ky. 1993) (noting that the issue
before the court was "not whether sexual activity traditionally viewed as immoral can be
punished by society, but whether it can be punished solely on the basis of sexual prefer-
ence"); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 869 S.W.2d 941
(Tex. 1994) ("We are mindful that homosexual conduct is abhorrent to the morals and deeply
held beliefs of many people.").
314 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 490 (noting that the Commonwealth's position that sodomy
was immoral did not waiver with "regard to whether the activity is conducted in private be-
tween consenting adults ... [or whether it is] harmful to the participants or to others").
315 Id. at 493.
316 Id. at 495.
317 See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ("The Court's
opinion should not in any way be deemed to condone or condemn any particular lifestyle or
the moral behavior associated therewith.").
318 Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 205.
319 Id.
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hibit lesbians and gay men from engaging in the same con-
duct in which heterosexuals may legally engage. In short,
the State cannot make the same conduct criminal when done
by one, and innocent when done by the other.
320
This neutral language comes closer to subverting the straight
mind. As Butler points out, "[i]f subversion is possible, it will be a
subversion from within the terms of law, through the possibilities
that emerge when the law turns against itself and spawns unex-
pected permutations of itself."321  While Campbell, Wasson,
Gryczan, and Morales seem a possible subversion, a "jovial hulla-
baloo," for now "we are where we began"-where only "widows
wince."3 22 We will have to wait awhile longer to see whether the
Supreme Court "take[s] The opposing law and make[s] a
peristyle"3 23 based on an ethics of care for the other.
320 Id. at 204. Although Gryczan rejects as a compelling state interest "a legislative dis-
taste of what is perceived to be offensive and immoral sexual practices on the part of homo-
sexuals," the decision does not accept differences or demonstrate an ethics of care for the
other. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 125-26 (Mont. 1997). Rather, Gryczan collapses
difference by repeating the phrase "regardless of gender" in its privacy analysis. See id. at
122, 125, 126.
321 BUTLER, supra note 41, at 93; see WITTIG, supra note 6, at 30 ("[Tlhere is another order
of materiality, that of language, and language is worked upon from within by these strategic
concepts.").
322 STEVENS, supra note 7, at 77-78.
323 Id.
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